Is Jusuf Nurkic still the "fit" he was advertised to be in Phoenix?

When the Phoenix Suns acquired Jusuf Nurkić as part of the blockbuster deal that landed Damian Lillard in Milwaukee and Deandre Ayton in Portland, there were certainly mixed reviews on the trade for Phoenix.

However, there was one word that came up time and time again when justifying the deal for the Suns—fit. Despite the fact that most would concede that Deandre Ayton is the "more talented" player between him and Nurkić, people kept coming back to the idea that Nurkić was a better fit for what Phoenix needed.

A low maintenance player. A guy that is comfortable in his role. A guy who doesn't demand touches offensively. A guy who fit Frank Vogel's system. A connective piece offensively.

In a lot of regards, those sentiments bared true. In Nurkić's first year in Phoenix, he was just about everything Suns fans could have hoped for when they acquired him, while Deandre Ayton struggled in Portland with the same frustrating inconsistencies he has for the majority of his career.

First off, Nurkić was a rebounding machine. This past year, he led the NBA in total rebound percentage, was seventh in the NBA in rebounds per game at 11.0, ranked in the 99th percentile at his position for defensive rebounding on the season, and even put up a franchise record 31-rebound game in March—the most by a player in any game since the 2010-2011 season.

Nurkić was also extremely welcomed as a connective piece offensively. He ranked sixth in the entire NBA among centers in assist percentage, behind only Nikola Jokić, Domantas Sabonis, Kelly Olynyk, Alperen Sengun, and Victor Wembanyama.

Given the lack of true playmakers or ball-handlers on last year's Suns team, a big who could keep the ball moving and even initiate some offense was an ideal fit given that roster construction decision by the front office to not employ a true, traditional point guard.

Nurkić also appeared to be a strong fit for—the now fired—Frank Vogel's system. Historically, Vogel has prioritized big-bodied centers with size to anchor his defenses, with Roy Hibbert in Indiana and the combination of Anthony Davis, Dwight Howard, and JaVale McGee in Los Angeles. Nurkić certainly fit that bill at 7'0" tall and 290 pounds—currently the heaviest player in the NBA.

And of course, Nurkić's locker room presence and overall selflessness as a teammate cannot be overstate. He proved himself to be a team first guy, willing to play any role the coaching staff needed from him and regularly sticking up for his teammates both on the court and in the media.

With all of that said, the 2024-2025 version of the Suns—while still built around the same core—will look noticeably different from a year ago.

For starters, there's a new voice at the helm with head coach Mike Budenholzer—and with a new coach comes a new philosophy.

At this point, coach Bud's system is well documented on both ends of the court. Defensively, he's become somewhat of the poster boy for drop coverage, and offensively, he wants to space the floor, spread the wealth, and as he calls it—play "random".

Historically, Bud's teams take and make a lot of three pointers. Outside of one outlier season—which featured a very underwhelming Hawks group in 2016-17—every team he has coached has finished in the top 10 in both three point attempts per game and three point makes per game—as highlighted below:

Three Point Volume for Mike Budenholzer-Coached Teams

This philosophy on three point shooting is one of the biggest reasons the Suns hired Budenholzer to coach the team, as Phoenix ranked only 24th in the NBA last season in three point volume as a team. They somehow were even worse in the postseason—failing to reach 30 attempts even one single time in their first round series defeat.

The Suns—in theory—have plenty of shooting, between Grayson Allen (46.1% from three a year ago), Devin Booker (36.4%), Kevin Durant (41.3%), Bradley Beal (43.0%), and Royce O'Neale (37.6%). Those players will help the cause, but perhaps the most underrated part of what's allowed Mike Budenholzer-led teams to be so successful from outside has been the presence of a stretch-five to space the floor—as highlighted below:

Three Point Shooting for Mike Budenholzer-Coached Big Men

*Note: Brook Lopez played only 13 games during the 2021-22 season.

Even though Horford's three point volume didn't begin to spike until his last season in Atlanta, it's clear that the presence of a center that's at least a threat to shoot from outside has done wonders for Coach Bud's offenses.

It's no surprise that the one outlier season in which his team was well outside the top 10 in three point volume happens to also be the one season in which his starting center was a total non-threat from outside in Dwight Howard. Even just the presence of Dewayne Dedmon—a borderline rotation player at best—as the starter in 2016-17 still allowed for Atlanta to get threes up alongside the league leaders.

So how does Nurkić fit into this?

Well, his three point volume has taken a significant uptick from where it was to begin his career—averaging 88.3 attempts per season over his last three years after taking only 82 total threes in the first seven seasons of his career combined. So, in theory, Nurkić could follow the Horford and Lopez path as late blooming three point shooters.

The difference between Nurkić and the stretch fives of Budenholzer's past? Bud's previous bigs all hovered around league average from deep, whereas Nurkić has shot only 30.2% from deep since his volume increased above 1.0 attempt per game—including just 24.4% last year.

Those percentages are just not going to cut it if Nurkić wants to truly be the pick-and-pop floor spacing threat that anchor's a Mike Budenholzer offense. Could it improve? Of course. Coach Bud has been one of the driving forces in transforming the careers of Al Horford and Brook Lopez into the shooters they are today, so who's to say he can't do the same with Nurkić?

But if Bud can't help Nurkić find his stroke, then his fit becomes a lot less clear as a paint clogger within an offensive system that will look to spread the floor as much as possible.

Aside from wanting to shoot more threes, the next biggest difference between the 2023-24 Phoenix Suns and this upcoming iteration of the team is the influx of playmaking and ball-handling that the team had with the additions of Tyus Jones and Monte Morris.

It is extremely well-documented—if not overdone at this point—that the Suns did not have a true point guard on the roster last season. As a result, Nurkić's aforementioned passing and playmaking ability became somewhat of a necessity, as opposed to a luxury for this team.

With the addition of not one, but two traditional point guards to the roster, it seems less and less likely that Nurkić is going to be the guy with ball in his hands running the offense in the half-court. His greatest offensive skill now becomes redundant—and to a degree—largely unnecessary.

So, where does that leave Nurkić in the offense if he's not going to be initiating and also doesn't space the floor? Well, it leaves him in a role where many other successful big men across the NBA thrive—as a rim-running finisher.

Think of other non-shooting bigs, such as Dereck Lively II, Jarrett Allen, Nic Claxton, or even a familiar face—Deandre Ayton. These players don't stretch the floor and they play exclusively off-ball, yet they play a key role for their teams as finishers that put pressure on the rim offensively.

In theory, if Nurkić embraced that role, the Suns might be all well and good with him at the five. The problem is, he's not nearly the athlete or lob threat that those players are—and most importantly—he lacks the number one skill needed to fill that role—finishing ability.

The numbers suggest that Nurkić is among the worst finishing big men in the entire NBA. Just last year, he ranked in only the 15th percentile among all bigs in rim field goal percentage and was 42nd out of 43 bigs that played at least 1,500 minutes in finishing around the rim—behind only Jaren Jackson Jr.

To add perspective, Nurkić converted at the rim at a lower clip than players such as Eric Gordon, Landry Shamet, Luke Kennard, Cole Anthony, and Payton Pritchard—not exactly great company.

With all that said, it seems obvious that what Phoenix needs most at the center position offensively is either floor spacing or finishing—and in a perfect world—both. Two things Nurkić provides neither of.

This leaves Jusuf Nurkić in a very peculiar position on the Suns heading into this season. He is unathletic, injury-prone, doesn't space the floor, can't finish around the rim, and his greatest skill—passing—is now redundant with higher priority offensive options.

Can he improve his three point shot under Bud? It's possible, but don't be fooled by the offseason workout videos. Can he develop into even an average finisher at the basket? Only time will tell, but now at age 30, it seems unlikely.

Once thought of by many as an ideal player for what the Suns needed at the center position, Nurkić's fit in Phoenix is becoming less and less clear to envision—and if the Suns get off to a slow start—his position will likely be the first place the front office looks to upgrade.