The Phoenix Suns are about to miss the playoffs for the fifth straight season. For the fourth winningest franchise in the NBA, the 2014-15 season has been a disappointment bred in heightened expectations after such a surprising 2013-14 campaign that saw the Suns win 48 games.
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Jeff Hornacek was a Coach of the Year candidate, Goran Dragic was a Third Team All-NBA point guard and Phoenix’s lovable band of misfits came within one game of the playoffs in a tanking season. Nobody outside of Suns territory gave them a chance to make the playoffs this year, but everybody in Phoenix knew different.
The rest of the world was going to doubt, and the Suns were going to shock them again.
Except it hasn’t panned out that way. One day after the All-Star break, the Suns had lost their place at eighth in the Western Conference and since then, it’s been a steady decline downhill. Before the break, the Suns were one of the most potent offenses in the league and had posted a respectable 29-25 record. Since then, the Suns are 9-13.
How did Phoenix’s offense crumble so dramatically? And how did the Suns’ defense suddenly become respectable? The season may be over, but in order to understand the path this team’s young core is on after a major roster shakeup, here’s look at how the Phoenix Suns found their defense and left the offense to die a slow and painful death.
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Death Of The Slash Brothers
At the trade deadline, the Suns shipped out one-third of the roster, including two members of the controversial “Point Guard Hydra.” By trading away Goran Dragic (16.2 PPG, 50.1 FG%) and Isaiah Thomas (15.2 PPG, 42.6 FG%), the Suns were bound to lose some of their offense. That’s 31 points per game right there.
Since acquiring Brandon Knight and turning even more of the ball-handling over to Eric Bledsoe, the Suns have seen their offensive rating plummet from 105.9 points per 100 possessions (seventh in the league) to 98.0 (26th). Their scoring averages have also dropped from 105.9 points per game (fourth) to 97.7 (22nd).
But this isn’t just a matter of pace, even if Phoenix’s fast break points per game have dropped from 19.6 to 16.3 without the one-man fast break. The quality of shots the Suns are getting without Dragic and I.T. has deteriorated as well, as reflected by the team’s diminishing shooting percentages:
- FG%: 46.1% (seventh) –> 43.9% (22nd)
- 3P%: 35.9% (eighth) –> 29.5% (30th)
- FT%: 78.5% (second) –> 70.7% (26th)
Before the break, the Suns were top eight in all shooting percentages. Now, they’re at the bottom of the barrel in each category. Losing an efficient shooter like Dragic (50.1 percent) was bound to make an impact, but did anybody see this kind of drastic decay coming?
Some of this stems from getting accustomed to new teammates, but with shooting percentages dramatically down across the board, how did we get to this point of offensive ineptitude?
Next: Old Problems Finally Surface
Season-Long Problems Culminate
Simply put, the loss of Dragic has had a deeper impact than just the scoring column.
The ball was usually in Eric Bledsoe’s hands even with Dragic on the roster, but the Dragon was skilled when it came to making the right pass to keep Phoenix’s iso-heavy offense moving. His passes wouldn’t always lead to an assist, but they kept the offense alive and led to one or two more passes that would eventually find the open man for a quality shot. The guy racked up hockey assists, in other words.
You know why the Golden State Warriors and Atlanta Hawks shoot the ball so well from three-point range? It’s not just that they have shooters capable of knocking down the long ball. It’s that their offenses are predicated on a lot of ball and player movement, leading to a higher number of open shots. It’s a lot easier to shoot basketball’s most important shot when you’re wide open.
Bledsoe has vastly expanded his game since last season, but he’s still not a facilitator. Neither is Brandon Knight. These two need the ball in their hands to be effective and generally look to score first. There’s nothing wrong with that, and Dragic technically fit that same mold as well.
But since trading away Dragic, any shred of ball movement the Suns had before has fallen by the wayside. Only 48.3 of Phoenix’s points per game are created by an assist. Compare that to the 64.8 points created by assists by a team like the Golden State Warriors and you can see how difficult it is to score with so much iso-ball — which, to be clear, has been a problem with the Suns all season long:
But Phoenix’s assist-to-turnover ratio went from an already bad 1.38 before the break (tied for 23rd in the league) to 1.24 after the roster shakeup (29th). Their assist percentage (52.3) remains 30th in the NBA, and now the turnovers have gotten completely out of hand.
The Suns were averaging 14.9 turnovers per game before (21st), but with the ball in Bledsoe’s hands more than ever, that number has regressed even further to 15.9 per game (25th).
Again, some of that stems from Bledsoe playing with new teammates (and even some old teammates in different roles). Some of that stems from the fact that this is only Bledsoe’s first full season as starter. But a lot of it stems from him charging to the basket out of control and either losing the ball when the help defense comes or jumping through the air with no plan and flinging the ball out of bounds.
Turnovers, iso-ball and a lack of movement (off-the-ball player movement and ball movement alike) have been problems all season long. But with Dragic and Thomas no longer around to make it look better than it was, those problems have reared their ugly heads.
Next: Knight Down
The Fallen Knight
Of course, it’s a lot harder to build chemistry with new teammates when your most important one has missed as many games as he’s played. You have to feel a little bit sorry for Brandon Knight, who was having a career year with the Milwaukee Bucks until they decided they didn’t want to pay up for him this summer and surprisingly traded him away.
Now Knight is in a system that will take the rock out of his hands and play him alongside a ball-dominant guard in Bledsoe. That’s a lot to take in in a limited amount of time, and it’s a major adjustment to make on the fly as your new team tries to compete for a playoff spot.
That adjustment hasn’t come easy for Knight. Here’s a look at how his numbers have declined from his time with the Bucks:
- PPG: 17.8 PPG –> 13.4 PPG
- APG: 5.4 APG –> 4.5 APG
- RPG: 4.3 RPG –> 2.1 RPG
- FG%: 43.5% –> 35.7%
- 3P%: 40.9% –> 31.3%
That’s not to make too many excuses for Knight, however. Some of the blame has to be on him. He’s mostly looked uncomfortable in a Suns uniform, and the one game where he looked most at home, he only played two quarters before going down with an ankle sprain (that part’s obviously not his fault).
Knight has missed 11 of a possible 22 games so far with the Suns, 10 of which were because of that ankle. As a restricted free agent this summer, Knight is heading for a big pay day, but Phoenix’s front office would probably feel a lot better about everything if they’d been able to see him play alongside Bledsoe a little bit more.
In any event, Knight’s absence has made it that much harder for the new-look Suns to develop any sort of cohesion. Hornacek’s lineups have had to change on a week-to-week basis, and it doesn’t help that when Knight’s been on the floor, he’s been nowhere near as effective without the ball in his hands.
Note: It’s worth mentioning that Bledsoe’s 43 percent shooting since the start of March hasn’t helped this whole backcourt dilemma.
Next: The Mook Effect
The Marcus Morris Effect
Knight’s ankle problems have opened an avenue for Marcus Morris to a starting spot and more responsibility on both ends of the floor. If you’re looking for the reason why the Suns went from a high scoring offense and porous defense to a bottom-feeder offense and stingy defense, look no further than the Mook effect.
By moving Marcus Morris into the lineup and switching P.J. Tucker to the other guard spot, the Suns have a size and strength advantage, something that’s been rare this season. With the Morrii, Tucker and Alex Len all available for rebounding, the Suns have gone from the league’s 19th ranked rebounding unit to its second best since All-Star Weekend.
By cleaning up the defensive boards, the Suns are limiting opponents’ second chance points. Before the break, the Suns gave up 15.3 second chance points per game, the worst mark in the league. Since then, the Suns are only giving up 12.2 second chance points per game, the ninth best mark in the NBA. Mook’s additional seven boards per game (in March) certainly helps there.
On flip side, #Suns have addressed two HUGE weaknesses (defense/rebounding) for over a month now. And now offense righting itself.
— Matt Petersen (@TheMattPetersen) March 25, 2015
It goes beyond rebounding, however. With Tucker defending guards and Mook holding his own on the wing, the Suns haven’t allowed as much penetration and when they have, Len, Markieff Morris or Brandan Wright have stepped up to make the shot more challenging.
Before the break, the Suns surrendered 46.6 points in the paint per game, the second most in the association. Now Phoenix has limited that number to 42.5 points in the paint per game, putting them in the NBA’s upper half. They’re not elite, but they’re no longer one of the NBA’s worst teams when it comes to giving up easy points in the lane.
The tougher wing defense and keeping teams out of the lane is reflected in their opponents’ scoring and field goal percentage:
- OPP PPG: 104.7 PPG (28th) –> 100.8 PPG (18th)
- OPP FG%: 45.5% (20th) –> 44.0% (10th)
The Suns’ defense isn’t elite by any means. But they’re controlling the boards and they’re no longer hemorrhaging points on a nightly basis. Phoenix’s defensive rating has improved from 104.1 points per 100 possessions to 101.0 and the biggest culprit has been moving Mook into the starting lineup with Knight sidelined.
Unfortunately, more minutes for Morris hasn’t exactly translated into offensive success. Though his scoring numbers are up (12.3 PPG in March), his field goal percentage has dropped all the way to 39.4 percent from the field and 26.1 percent from downtown since Mar. 1.
With Mook taking nearly four more field goal attempts per game than he was when he was coming off the bench, those extra looks haven’t translated to efficiency. Nobody in Phoenix is shooting the ball particularly well these days, but if it weren’t for this team’s improvements on the defensive end, Morris’ up-and-down shooting would have caught more people’s attention.
The bad news is that for all of Phoenix’s improvements on the defensive end, the tradeoff hasn’t been kind to their ability to win games. Phoenix’s point differential went from +1.2 before the break to -3.1 afterward. Marcus Morris is by no means the primary factor in that drop-off, and his inclusion in the starting lineup has shown fans their first look at what a respectable defense looks like.
But with Mook and the rest of the team struggling to put the ball in the basket, it’s hard to advocate for this new starting lineup lasting any longer than it needs to — even with the Suns already out of the playoff hunt.
All statistics are from NBA.com
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